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the highest levels of literacy (nearly universal for the
young) and longevity (a life expectancy of about 74
years) in India. But it also has, by a very wide margin, the
highest rate of reported morbidity among all Indian
states (this applies to age specific as well as total
comparisons). At the other extreme, states with low lon›
gevity, with woeful medical and educational facilities,
such as Bihar, have the lowest rates of reported morbid›
ity in India. Indeed, the lowness of reported morbidity
runs almost fully in the opposite direction to life expect›
ancy, in interstate comparisons.3–5
We have to ask why such dissonance arises. There is
much evidence that people in states that provide more
education and better medical and health facilities are in
a better position to diagnose and perceive their own
particular illnesses than are the people in less
advantaged states, where there is less awareness of treat›
able conditions (to be distinguished from “natural” states
of being). The medically ill›served and substantially illit›
erate population of Bihar may have a very low
perception of illness, but that is no indication that there
is little illness to perceive. This interpretation is
supported also by comparing the reported morbidity
rates in the Indian states and in the United States. In dis›
ease by disease comparison, while Kerala has much
higher reported morbidity rates than the rest of India,
the United States has even higher rates for the same ill›
nesses.6 If we insist on relying on self reported morbidity
as the measure, we would have to conclude that the
United States is the least healthy in this comparison, fol›
lowed by Kerala, with ill provided Bihar enjoying the
highest level of health, in this charmed internal
comparison.
Although the internal view is privileged with respect
to some information (particularly that of a sensory
nature), it can be deeply deficient in other ways. There is
a strong need for scrutinising the statistics on self
perception of illness in a social context by taking note of
levels of education, availability of health facilities, and
public information on illness and remedy.3–5 The
internal view of health deserves attention, but relying
on it in assessing health care or in evaluating medical
strategy can be extremely misleading.
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The medicalisation of old age
Should be encouraged
The Oxford English Dictionary describes medicali›sation as pejorative, initially applied to theover›investigation and treatment of sexually
active teenage girls. Since Ivan Illich’s popularisation
of the term, its use has spread to conditions such as
pregnancy and childbirth, sexual orientation, mental
illness, and the menopause. There is legitimate
concern about the medicalisation of dying,1 and
because old people die, it is tempting to extend such
concern to old age.
In the 1930s, Marjory Warren showed that old
people in workhouse wards had treatable diseases and
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could be rehabilitated and discharged. Apparent social
problems were in fact a result of patients being poorly
served by health services. With the realisation that
something could be done for elderly patients and that
such care would make hospitals run more efficiently,
geriatric medicine has grown dramatically in the
United Kingdom, but less so elsewhere.2 However, in
the past decade the problems of elderly people have
been “de›medicalised” by the movement of patients
from hospitals into nursing homes, where their health
care has been substituted by social care.3 The
warehousing of frail elderly people in nursing homes is
a result of medical disinterest and of political ideology,
and has led to a social model of care in which medicine
is denied a role.4 At a less extreme level, evidence of
benefit from social interventions in the form of aids
and appliances for mobility problems in old age has
been reported.5 But how many of these people would
benefit from medical treatment?
With the increase in life expectancy over the past
century, people in their 90s are commonplace, and
questions are raised about the wisdom of using invasive
and expensive treatments for their illnesses.6 Chrono›
logical age is a poor marker of vitality and ability to
benefit from treatment. Variability in the physiological
reserves of very old people and the limited evidence
base of treatment efficacy at ages over 80 years makes
it difficult to generalise about the value of intervention
at older ages. Here clinical judgment and patients’
views—including living wills—are important in making
treatment decisions. Diagnosing “dying” and providing
palliative care rather than making futile attempts to
cure is essential but difficult because of limited
prognostic information about the probability of dying,
and the training of doctors that emphasises cures.7
“A fair innings?”
“The years of our life are threescore and ten, or even by
reason of strength fourscore; yet their span is but toil
and trouble; they are soon gone, and we fly away”
(Psalms 90, 10). Traditionally the biblical threescore
and ten years have been misinterpreted as a natural
limit, but the psalm is concerned with the nature of life
and not its span. For example, Williams states, “Anyone
who achieves or exceeds this is reckoned to have had a
fair innings . . .”6 However, the fair innings argument as
a means of rationing healthcare resources has
limitations. Without compulsory euthanasia at the end
of the innings, palliative care may prove more
expensive than therapeutic treatments.6 Concerns
about medicalisation of old age may hide a desire to
reduce costs.8 It is dying in hospital—not an ageing
population—that costs money. If people die later the
costs of health care will fall later, but this is the cost of
dying, not of ageing.9
As Skrabanek commented, “Since life itself is a uni›
versally fatal sexually transmitted disease, living it to
the full demands a balance between reasonable and
unreasonable risk.”10 Even among individuals who
indulge in risky lifestyles a minority succeed in exceed›
ing the age of 70 years.11 Elderly people today are
probably fitter than those of two decades ago, but old
age still covers a wide range of conditions and needs,
from the fit to the frail. Although ageing is a natural
process, it would be wrong to conclude that the
diseases that accompany it are also natural and should
be excluded from medical attention. Myriad trials have
shown the benefits of treating rather than ignoring the
health problems of older people.12 Evidence from trials
of blood pressure lowering and statins shows us that
old people are no different from younger people in
their response to treatment, but because of their higher
levels of risk, gain greater absolute benefits from effec›
tive treatments. Effective treatments for cataract,
hearing impairments, angina, osteoarthritis, impo›
tence, depression, and other common conditions exist
and should be used.
Keep young and beautiful
The growing population of affluent older people may
have greater expectations of medical care, fuelled both
by greater consumerism and the promotion of new
medical technologies by doctors and the pharmaceuti›
cal industry. Are older people likely to demand cures
for wrinkles, baldness, yellow teeth, and relief from
symptoms of the menopause and andropause? You
bet! “Keep young and beautiful if you want to be loved”
is the message these days. We have botulinum toxin for
the treatment of wrinkles, minoxidil for male pattern
baldness, tooth whitening treatments; hormone
replacement therapy for women (but not men, yet). But
medicalisation of the two commonest social scourges
of old age—poverty and loneliness—has not occurred,
suggesting that medicine does recognise some limits.
Arie comments, “it is much more society’s conven›
ience that ‘medicalises’ complex problems than the
avidity of doctors to take responsibility for them.”13
Hollywood and the media promote positive images of
older people, but it would be surprising if society’s
stereotypes of beauty were to be reoriented towards
images of old age. So demands for medical fixes for
ageing are likely to grow. Only a few of these
discretionary treatments are likely to be funded in a
national healthcare system. Extension of the general
principles of evidence based medicine to providers of
these treatments will be needed but may be resisted.
Consumer and retired people’s associations may be in
the best position to lobby policy makers for such
extension.
Medicalisation can be dangerous. Legitimate
concerns exist about the risks of infection during hos›
pitalisation, over›prescribing, inappropriate use of
tranquillisers for restraint, and the hazards of pressure
sores. But many of these problems occur in social care
and represent poor standards of practice. Hazards
associated with medical care exist at any age and are
not valid reasons for forgoing the potential benefits of
treatment. Furthermore, many dangers of medical care
are avoidable.14
In summary, the medicalisation of old age is not to
be repudiated, but should be encouraged. Greater
access to medical care for older people will result in
reductions in mortality and disability. Attempts to
ration such care on the grounds of the fair innings
argument or by chronological age are flawed.
Treatments to combat the ageing process itself should
be subject to the same regulatory framework as any
new medical technology. In wealthy countries there is
no excuse for ignoring the medical problems of older
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people or attempting to redefine them as social
problems, and therefore outside the remit of medicine.
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Genetics and medicalisation
Genetics could drive a new wave of medicalisation if genetic tests are accepted
without appropriate clinical evaluation
In the public imagination genetic science hasalready brought us close to a world in which testsand cures are available for most diseases. The
immediate prospects are, however, decidedly more
prosaic. With the exception of the relatively rare high
penetrance, single gene disorders, genetic tests differ
little from most other medical tests, providing evidence
of statistical risk only. Inflated perceptions of the value
of specific genetic tests could drive a wave of inappro›
priate medicalisation. Genetic claims, tests, and
treatments, like others, should be subjected to
evaluation to establish their clinical usefulness, so that
doctors and patients can act on sound evidence.
The term “genetics” conveys two different concepts:
genetics as the study of inherited characteristics, and
genetics as the study of cellular processes controlled by
DNA. DNA codes lie at the centre of the biological
processes in all living cells and generate the protein
building blocks for cellular activity. Variations in coding
abound between people. The differences occasionally
derive from variations in a single gene, but much more
typically they derive from the interacting effects of
many genes. DNA is no blind cipher, but part of a
modulating system interacting with cellular mecha›
nisms and environmental factors, that together time
and modify the expression of proteins within the cells
that make up the human organism.1
In the public mind, high penetrance, single gene
disorders, such as Huntington’s disease, dominate the
image of genetics and genetic testing and are a
stereotype of inevitable future disaster.2 Fortunately
this stereotype is misleading when applied to the more
common multifactorial conditions and even to many
single gene disorders that often show considerable
variation in clinical manifestations. The thalassaemias,
for example, show great phenotypic variation, with a
variety of factors—environmental and genetic—
influencing eventual outcome.3
The genes that play a part in the pathogenesis of
most common disorders are for the most part as yet
unidentified and their role ill understood. Individually
their predictive value is low, and at present there is little
to suggest that they will have any greater clinical value
than more conventional physiological risk markers,
such as blood pressure or cholesterol concentrations.
We believe, as do others, that the arguments for
“genetic exceptionalism”—for treating genetic infor›
mation and tests as somehow special—are not compel›
ling.4 5 Outside the high penetrance, single gene
disorders, genetic tests, like most other medical tests,
provide evidence only of statistical risks.
Most physiological deviations are continuously dis›
tributed in the population, and most pathological
processes give rise to a range of severity in clinical signs
and symptoms.6 Clinical practice requires the establish›
ment of agreed cut off points to identify disease and to
separate people for whom treatment should be benefi›
cial from other patients for whom the risks of diagno›
sis or treatment might outweigh the benefits.
Over time, the tendency has been to expand
diagnostic and treatment boundaries, and to include in
the “disease” category people with milder manifesta›
tions of pathology and lower levels of risk. Genetic tests
for markers that may not result in symptoms for half a
century or more could be new examples of a process of
premature medicalisation—of attaching the “disease”
label before it has been established that prevention or
treatment is clearly beneficial. Treating the presence of
a genetic marker as though it were the clinical disease
can be very unhelpful. In haemochromatosis, less than
1% of homozygotes for the responsible genetic variant
develop frank clinical manifestations.7
New testing technology is creating inexpensive
ways of identifying differences in many genetic
sequences all at once, but as yet there is little clinical
value in knowing about such polymorphisms. Epidemi›
ology and clinical trials will be needed to test claims
linking genetic variants to disease. Unless it is
established that a genetic variant is a pointer to benefi›
cial action, there is a potential for inappropriate medi›
calisation through the spread of poorly understood
tests. The perceptions of risk resulting from such tests
may bear little relation to the scientific facts and uncer›
tainties. Inflated ideas about risks could result in people
carrying such polymorphisms being treated unfairly in
many areas, including employment or insurance.8
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